Very recently I came across Oxford University Press’ Very Short Introduction series. The series comprises now of almost 300 titles ranging from Archaeology and Art to Medicine and Social Sciences. Of course, there are also some titles dealing with economics and other more quantitative topics; Game Theory is one of them. There could not be a more obvious and substantial difference to popular science books covering Game Theory (in a good sense).
Binmore covers a broad range of topics, from conflict and cooperation to conventions, bargaining and auctions. Most important he links the theory to observed behavior and evolutionary dynamics that may explain deviations from some of the normative predictions of standard Game Theory (under assumptions of perfect rationality and opportunistic preferences). It is these discussions of evolutionary dynamics that made the small book (less than 200 pages) worthwhile for me.
For the most part Binmore’s writing style is crystal clear. However, I had, of course, substantial training in Game Theory and need to apply it quite often. Even though Binmore explanations and definitions are easy to follow I fear that there is still too much jargon, too few definitions and a lack explanations of some of the essential concepts of Game Theory that would be needed for a real introduction.